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At about 9:00 p.m. on May 7, 2007, Dritan and Shain Duka arrived at a home in Cherry Hill, New Jersey. 1  They had an important meeting that
night—a meeting long in the making.  They rang the doorbell and waited. Their appointment was to purchase AK-47 and M-16 assault rifles, the
first installment of weapons needed for a terrorist attack against targets in the U.S. The Dukas must have been nervous; Osama bin Laden himself
had not successfully attacked the United States at home since September 11th. The Dukas probably did not attribute al Qa‘ida and bin Laden’s
failure to an innovation in U.S. government counter terrorism organization. Perhaps they should have. Members of the South Jersey Joint
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) closed in, arresting the Dukas and four other alleged co-conspirators. Work by the JTTF, involving law enforcement
personnel from a sweeping range of local, state, and federal agencies, had turned a single tip into six arrests.  
That tip, from Circuit City clerk Brian Morgenstern, began an eighteen-month long investigation by the South Jersey JTTF. 2  Over a year and a
half, the JTTF tracked the suspects and their activities by drawing on the expertise, contacts, and unique knowledge of individual JTTF members
from law enforcement agencies at every jurisdictional level. The team collaborated to build an investigation on thorough and convincing evidence
of the suspects’ conspiracy to attack the U.S. Army base at Fort Dix, New Jersey, as well as possibly other military bases and public events. On
May 7, 2007, the “Fort Dix Six” were arrested and accused of conspiring to commit murder. Since that time, one of the conspirators has pled
guilty to weapons charges. The other suspects await trial.
HOMELAND SECURITY AND INNOVATING BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATION
The Joint Terrorism Task Force is a homeland security success because of the “mission-first” attitude inherent to its organization. The JTTFs, as
“cross-functional teams,” are composed of officers from nearly every major law enforcement entity in the United States. This organization makes
the mission paramount by subordinating traditional institutional and bureaucratic boundaries to the critical counterterrorism tasks at hand. The
fact that terrorists have not successfully conducted a domestic terrorist attack against the United States is not an accident and is not for lack of
effort on the terrorists’ part. Dr. James Carafano of the Heritage Foundation notes at least sixteen major terror plots disrupted by U.S. law
enforcement since the World Trade Center attack. 3  The case of the Dukas’ conspiracy is just one thread in a tapestry of counterterrorism and
homeland security successes by the JTTFs since 9/11. 
Consequence management, the ability of the U.S. government to respond to and recover from a devastating terrorist attack or natural disaster,
will be the most critical element of homeland security success in the future. Even if we are able to prevent every future terrorist attack, the U.S.
government must still be capable of responding to catastrophic natural disasters to save lives and diminish damage to property. As President Bush
and others have said, while the U.S. government must be right every time, the terrorists need only be lucky once.  Hurricane Katrina painfully
demonstrated that when local, state, and federal agencies respond to catastrophes, the whole is far less than the sum of its parts. Though some
progress is being made, observations from the most recent National Level Exercises and observations recorded in the 2006 Katrina Lessons
Learned Report still reflect that mission success in consequence management takes a backseat to parochialism among departments and agencies.
4
This essay identifies what makes the JTTF successful and applies those lessons to the planning and execution of consequence management
operations.  The first section of the essay addresses the Department of Justice charter for preventing terrorist attacks and the history of the JTTF
as the context for its organizational arrangement and success. The second section proposes applying a structure similar to that of the JTTF to U.S.
government consequence management planning and execution. 
EXPLORING THE SUCCESS OF THE JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE
The JTTF is structured to meet mission requirements rather than managerial vision per se. Former President Clinton’s Presidential Decision
Directive – 39 validated and reaffirmed a long-accepted view that law enforcement, in particular the FBI, leads the domestic counterterrorism
mission. 5  Those responsible for accomplishing this mission, FBI special agents in the field, recognized that they could never succeed without the
help and contributions of all other stakeholders. The normal organization of the FBI was insufficient to cover the totality of their responsibilities.
The FBI accepted the interagency task force as the best mechanism for integrating all local, state, and federal stakeholders into the
counterterrorism mission. The FBI first explored flexible interagency task forces in 1979 with criminal bank robbery investigations in New York
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City. 6  This criminal task force featured a single location with personnel from the FBI, New York State, and New York City law enforcement
agencies and was a major success. In May 1980, FBI special agents decided the interagency task force organizational arrangement was the
mechanism they needed to accomplish the counterterrorism mission. The New York City Task Force responded to terrorist threats by Puerto
Rican separatists, the Weathermen Underground, and violent elements of the Black Panther Party that were joining together. “Out of necessity,”
notes Supervisory Special Agent Brad Swim of the National Joint Terrorism Task Force, “New York ventured into the Task Force concept for the
JTTF.”
Since that time, the JTTF has become the federal model for the counterterrorism mission. As of October 2007, 102 JTTFs operated full-time, with
just over half their personnel from the FBI, 25 percent from state and local law enforcement, and 21 percent from other federal law enforcement
agencies. 7  Individual JTTFs have no set staffing pattern; staffing, like counterterrorism investigation, is a franchise responsibility. State and local
law enforcement agencies offer their personnel for detail to the local JTTF because of the valuable networking and investigative experience they
gain. The broad acceptance of the concept and its record of terrorism prevention strongly suggest that the JTTF works.
The core principles of synergy and task orientation make the JTTF successful.  Ideally, JTTF members assigned by their parent agency are full
partners in every aspect of JTTF operations without regard to which federal, state, or local law enforcement agency employs them. 8  The
individuals working at the JTTF who are not FBI personnel provide valuable reach back and collaboration with their parent agencies, but their
daily assignments and investigative duties support only JTTF operations. This arrangement avoids supervisory conflicts. The regular cycling of
employees from other law enforcement agencies to the JTTF facilitates a level of information sharing and collaboration that would be impossible
in separate organizations that meet and share information only occasionally. The JTTF, representing the work of all area law enforcement in
countering terrorism, exemplifies government operations that add up to more than the sum of their parts.
APPLYING THE SUCCESS OF THE JTTF TO CONSEQUENCE
MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS
Public and private sector studies on “matrix organizations” and “cross-functional teams” describe why the principles of the JTTF work well.
According to a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, “collaboration can be broadly defined as any joint activity that is intended to
produce more public value than could be produced when organizations act alone.” 9  The GAO contends this extra value is generated through a
defined and articulated common outcome; mutually reinforcing or joint strategies; leveraging common resources; agreed upon roles and
responsibilities; and compatible policies and procedures among other elements. All these points are exemplified by the JTTF organization. Private
sector organizational theorists Donald Cushman and Sarah King call this “cross-functional teamwork,” 10  which enhances organizational
efficiency by “effective removal of all the artificial barriers between functional units along the value chain of the firm.” Cross-functional teamwork
also facilitates “cooperation between people from different traditional organizational units,” eliminating problems which plague a company or its
customers as a result of a cross-functional dispute where no one entity controls the process. Finally, “cross-functional teams facilitate intraproject
and interproject cooperation.” These qualities, found in the JTTF, are absent from U.S. government consequence management operations where
institutional boundaries are paramount over mission success.
Cushman and King identify a major reason why consequence management operations fail. They aptly, albeit pessimistically, state that “people
who work in different functions [organizations] hate each other.” 11  The JTTF, as a cross-functional team, makes the traditional jurisdictional
disputes of law enforcement irrelevant by reorienting everyone towards the same goal on the same team. The National Response Framework
(NRF), the updated guidelines for U.S. government consequence management, often confuses the reader with multiple goals under several
command structures in numerous offices across different locations. Rather than upsetting the traditional authorities and their corresponding
budgets, the NRF at times seems to reinforce the primacy of institutional boundaries at the expense of the mission. The overlapping
responsibilities of the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) and the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) serve as an example.
While the NRCC is the coordination center for all disasters in the United States, the NIFC acts as another coordination center for only fire
emergencies. While both these staffs work hard to support senior leader decision makers, having two operations centers, where one could suffice,
creates a needless opportunity for confusion. Firefighters and decision makers may be left perplexed about whose information is correct and who
is really in charge.
Observers should not be surprised that the JTTF has enjoyed success; after all, it has gone farther than most elements of the U.S. government to
institute the cross-functional team model. In Managing the Public Organization, Cole Graham and Steven Hays articulate the vision of cross-
functional teams (also called matrix organizations):
In matrix organizations, the various specialists are joined in a common purpose, thanks to their membership on a team that is supervised and
coordinated by an individual with responsibility for achieving a defined set of project goals.  Meanwhile, however, their ties to their functional
departments are not entirely severed…in addition to enabling managers to coordinate specialists more effectively, matrix organizations have
achieved a reputation for creating work environments that are highly motivating and productive of innovations. 12
In his book, Richard Daft outlines three conditions that precipitate the need for matrix organizations. 13  The cross-functional team is the most
desirable approach when two or more critical sectors compete for lead responsibility in a task area; when the task environment is complex and
uncertain; and when an economy of scale is required to conserve resources. No U.S. government mission reflects these three conditions more than
consequence management operations. Our Federalist principles will not allow a single U.S. government entity to own all aspects of consequence
management. 14  Cross-functional teams must solve the problems posed by consequence management.
The federal government should adopt a sensible process for consequence management planning and execution at the headquarters level, 15  and
nominate a single cross-functional team under an individual department or agency for each step of that process.  This assembly line would consist
of cross-functional teams with members from all federal departments and agencies and some state, local, non-profit, and private sector entities
that are owned and housed by a lead department or agency. An example process is outlined below: 16
Threat Analysis – completed by a cross-functional team under the director of National Intelligence, identifies which missions demand
imminent preparation;
Strategic Guidance Statement – completed by a cross-functional team owned by the White House Homeland Security Council, establishes the
goals for planning; 
Deliberate Planning Process – completed by the Incident Management Planning Team (IMPT), a cross-functional team already in existence
and owned by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), produces the following:
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analysis of the mission  based on the strategic guidance, with IMPT team members obtaining feedback from their parent organizations;
a concept of operations to be approved by each parent organization; and
a full deliberate plan for review and approval by the senior leaders in each representative organization;
Crisis Action Plan – completed by a cross-functional team in the DHS National Operations Center (NOC) no more than twenty-four hours
after a contingency occurs, fills in the holes of the IMPT’s deliberate plan with the event’s details; and
Mission Assignments – completed by a cross-functional team in the Federal Emergency Management Agency NRCC, gives specific orders for
every actor in the crisis to conduct their missions according to the plan produced by the NOC.
This process, based on cross-functional teaming, guarantees a collaboratively-developed, collaboratively-executed consequence management
operation at the federal department and agency level.
While fully reorganizing the federal government consequence management planning and execution system into cross-functional teams is
revolutionary, there are some indications that such a change may be underway. DHS, created in the aftermath of 9/11, aspired to the effects of a
cross-functional team but failed to institute the concept as designed. The IMPT theoretically is a cross-functional team, but so far has only a low
level of representation from organizations outside DHS. The IMPT is a cross-functional team for deliberate planning, but federal department and
agency headquarters also need cross-functional teams to identify threats, provide strategic guidance, and then turn deliberate plans into crisis
action plans and mission assignments. Our current piecemeal initiatives are well-meaning but miss the mark. Real success in consequence
management operations will require a revolution of the bureaucracy, with cross-functional teams as the organizing principle.
CONCLUSION
Our nation’s federalism guarantees that we will continue to have essential responsibilities dispersed across many organizations at the federal,
state, and local levels of government as well as non-profit and private sector organizations. To avoid the inevitable confusion created by diffuse
responsibilities across multiple layers of government in a crisis situation, we need to adopt cross-functional teaming on a grand scale. The JTTF
has demonstrated the manifold benefits of cross-functional teams by demonstrating success in counterterrorism. The American people deserve
the demonstrated success of cross-functional teaming for consequence management, the most critical future aspect of homeland security.
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